Previous studies of the e¤ect of school entry age on educational attainment may be severely biased because they violate the monotonicity assumption needed for LATE. We propose an instrument not subject to this bias and show no e¤ect on children born in the fourth quarter of moving from a December 31 to an earlier cuto¤. To determine whether the IV estimates diverge because of bias or because they estimate di¤erent LATEs we estimate a structural model of optimal entry age that reconciles the di¤erent IV estimates. Our estimates imply that one standard instrument is badly biased but that the other diverges from ours because it estimates a di¤erent LATE. We also …nd that an early entry age cuto¤ that is applied loosely (as in the 1950s) is bene…cial but one that is strictly enforced is not.
Introduction
Following Krueger's (1991, 1992) seminal papers, much research in both education and economics has been devoted to obtaining consistent estimates of the e¤ect of school entry age on outcomes. Angrist and Krueger address the potential endogeneity of entry age by using quarter of birth as an instrument for entry age. They show that historically individuals born in the …rst quarter started school later than those born in the fourth quarter, completed less education and earned less than those born in the rest of the year. 1 Critics of this approach argue that quarter of birth may be directly related to student outcomes or parental socioeconomic status. 2 Casting doubt on the exogeneity of the quarter of birth instrument, Buckles and Hungerman (2008) provide evidence that children born at di¤erent times in the year are conceived by women with di¤erent socioeconomic characteristics.To address this problem, several researchers have exploited the variation in state laws governing entry age to identify its e¤ect on test scores, wages, educational attainment and other outcomes. 3 However, since entry age depends on both state law and date of birth, the potential endogeneity of date of birth remains problematic for this approach.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we address certain under-appreciated issues in the instrumental variable literature. Imbens (1994, 1995) and Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996) show that with heterogeneous treatment e¤ects, under certain conditions, IV identi…es the Local Average Treatment E¤ect (LATE). One condition, termed "monotonicity," generally treated as an unimportant regularity condition, requires that while the instrument may have no e¤ect on some individuals, all of those who are a¤ected should be a¤ected unidirectionally. We argue that both standard instruments, quarter of birth and legal entry age, provide inconsistent estimates of LATE because they violate monotonicity. Therefore, we propose an instrument that satis…es monotonicity and gives consistent estimates of the LATE of school entry age on educational attainment.
Second, we are interested in the broader question of the optimal age at which to start school and, in particular, optimal policy regarding school entry age. It is not clear that either of the two standard instruments, even if consistent, would estimate a LATE that is of policy interest. If the law were uniform and strictly enforced and therefore monotonicity satis…ed, the "born in …rst quarter" instrument could only hope to identify the e¤ect of entering school when roughly six months older (on average) than those born in the other three quarters. 4 A practical policy might allow children born in the …rst quarter to enter a year earlier than policy previously permitted. Unless we believe that the e¤ect of entry age is linear, the e¤ect of an average six-month di¤erence in entry may be very uninformative about the e¤ect of entering a full year earlier. Assessing the LATE measured when we use legal entry age as an instrument is more complex but similar.
Our instrument measures the e¤ect on children who would otherwise enter kindergarten in the year they turn …ve of delaying entry until the year in which they turn six. Given the historical nature of our data, the instrumental variables approach captures the e¤ect of such a delay as it was practiced in the 1950s. But school entry age laws are now enforced much more strictly. Consequently, we construct a model of optimal school entry age that is well-suited to conducting several policy experiments including examining the e¤ect of stricter enforcement.
Our Two Sample Instrumental Variable (TSIV) results show that using the quarter of birth instrument yields severely biased estimates of the e¤ect of requiring students to enter school later than they would otherwise have chosen. When we use the consistent estimator that meets the monotonicity requirement and measures this LATE, the e¤ect of school entry age on educational attainment is very close to zero.
However, comparing the di¤erent IV estimates does not tell us whether they diverge because the traditional estimators are inconsistent or because they are measuring di¤erent LATEs. Therefore, we develop a model of optimal school entry ages. We estimate the parameters of the model using indirect inference.
Our results show that in states with a late cuto¤, the earliest optimal entry age ranges from age 4 to 4.5 years depending on the model. 5 In states with a fourth quarter cuto¤ the optimal entry age distribution is shifted by less than 0.01 years, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that optimal entry age is una¤ected by the cuto¤ date.
Further, we use our simulated data to obtain "true"and IV estimates of the local average treatment e¤ect of school entry age on educational attainment. We …nd that the IV estimate based on the "legal entry age" instrument is a badly biased estimator of the LATE it is intended to estimate. In contrast, in our simulations, using "born in …rst quarter" as an instrument generates estimates that diverge only modestly from the LATE the estimator seeks to determine.
The next section explores the literature on school entry age. Section III outlines the Two Sample Instrumental Variable methods that we use for our baseline model. Section IV describes the data. We present the TSIV results in section V. Section VI builds and 4 Literally, the weighted average of the e¤ect of di¤erent entry age discrepancies with a mean discrepancy of about six months. 5 We impose that the latest optimal entry age is seven.
estimates a model of optimal school entry age. We use this model to evaluate two standard IV estimators found in the literature. In addition, we conduct two policy experiments to understand the e¤ect of entry policies on educational attainment. Section VII concludes.
2 School Entry Age: Background
Literature
There has been a recent explosion of interest in school entry age that makes it di¢ cult to treat the literature with justice. Until the 1990s, studies that looked at the e¤ect of school entry age on student outcomes largely ignored the potential endogeneity of entry age.
However, a-uent parents can a¤ord child care costs associated with delaying their child's school entry and are therefore more likely to do so. 7 In this paper, we argue that these …ndings are suspect because of important issues with the identi…cation strategies used in the existing literature.
Speci…cation Issues
Historically, economists assumed that instrumental variables estimates captured a single coe¢ cient, the common e¤ect of the explanatory variable on the dependent variable. Lang One of the assumptions for the identi…cation of LATE is monotonicity: while the in-strument may have no e¤ect on some individuals, all of those who are a¤ected must be a¤ected in the same direction. Both the quarter of birth instrument and the legal entry age instrument violate the monotonicity assumption. Many parents do not enroll their children at the earliest permissible entry age, (and some …nd ways to enroll them earlier than is formally allowed). Such strategic behavior is more common among parents of children born in the latter half of the year (West, Meek and Hurst, 2000) . Thus almost all students born in May enter kindergarten in September following their …fth birthday (or …rst grade following their sixth birthday). In contrast, some children born in October will enter before their …fth birthday, when they are younger than those born in May, while others will enter the following year when they are older than entrants born in May. Therefore quarter of birth is not monotonically related to school entry age. born in the fourth quarter have a higher probability of entering school when they are old.
However, the youngest children entering school, those who are only 3.75 years old are also born in the fourth quarter. 8 We summarize the comparison between children born in the …rst and fourth quarters in 1952 in …gure 1. We can see that neither distribution of entry age is greater than the other in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance. Being born in the …rst quarter rather than the fourth quarter raises entry age for some children and lowers it for others.
The …fth column reports the entry age distribution for fourth quarter born children who were born before the state cuto¤ and were therefore eligible to enter kindergarten even before they turn …ve. 9 In this group, 23% of the 1952 cohort and 9% of the 1953 cohort had delayed entry. Even taking into account that some children may have been retained in grade, it is evident that there was considerable redshirting. 8 The ages refer to the year before …rst grade for those who do not attend kindergarten. Equivalently, we assume that students who enter school in …rst grade would have spent one year in kindergarten had they enrolled. The dating of kindergarten entry is imperfect because we do not have data on retention. The higher rate of "late" entry in 1952 probably re ‡ects the greater time that the older children have had to be retained in grade. 9 Unconstrained states refer to states where fourth quarter children are not constrained by the law to delay school entry. These would be, for instance, states with January 1 st cuto¤s. On the other hand, constrained states refer to states with an October 1 st cuto¤. It is also evident that in the 1950s, there was considerable ‡exibility around state cuto¤s.
About half of children born in the fourth quarter in states with cuto¤s on or before October 1 nevertheless entered school before they turned …ve.
It is easy to develop examples where the IV estimate using QOB or legal entry age gives severely biased estimates because of the failure of the monotonicity assumption. For simplicity assume that children are born either in the …rst half of the year, in which case they enter school when they are 5.5 years old or in the second half of the year in which case they can enter when they are either 5 or 6. Suppose that all children bene…t from entering school when they are older. However, 75% get a bene…t of 4 (on some measure) from being 6 instead of 5.5 (and lose 4 from being 5 instead of 5.5). For the parents of these children, the bene…t of delay does not outweigh the cost of extra child care. All such children enter at age 5. However, 25% of children get a bene…t of 12 from entering at age 6 instead of 5.5. The parents of these children all choose to delay the child's entry. The average gain (treatment e¤ect) from delaying entry from age 5.5 to age 6 is 0.75*4+0.25*12 = 6. However, the IV estimate is the average outcome for those born in the second half of the year minus the average outcome for those born in the …rst half of the year divided by the di¤erence in average age at entry or 0=0:25 = 0: Even though every child bene…ts from entering school when older, the IV estimate is that entry age has no e¤ ect on the outcome. As this simple example illustrates, failure to satisfy the monotonicity assumption can produce an estimate with the wrong sign.
Although neither quarter of birth nor legal entry age satis…es monotonicity, it is possible to …nd an instrument that satis…ed monotonicity. Figure 2 reproduces the last two columns of table 1 for 1952. We can see that …rst-order stochastic dominance is satis…ed: children born in the fourth quarter in states that prohibit them from entering kindergarten in the year that they turn …ve enter school later than do those in states that permit them to enter.
While …rst-order stochastic dominance is only a necessary, not a su¢ cient, condition for monotonicity, in this case we require only that nobody who, if unconstrained, would have entered school in the year he turned six, chooses to enter school in the year he turns …ve because the law prohibits it. 
CDF of Entry Age: Constrained v Unconstrained States
In the next two sections we compare IV estimates of the e¤ect of school entry on educational attainment for di¤erent choices of instrument. We use the argument above to propose an instrument that satis…es monotonicity and show that the quarter of birth instrument and the legal entry age instrument give biased estimates of the policy-relevant LATE.
Methods: Two Sample Instrumental Variables
We estimate the following equation for educational attainment:
where, A i is the educational attainment of individual i. D i is the dummy endogenous variable that takes on the value of 1 if individual i 0 s school entry is delayed from the year in which he turns …ve to the year in which he turns six. Q ij is a set of three dummy variables (j = 2; 3; 4) indicating the quarter of birth of the ith individual. X i is a vector of observable individual characteristics and R i denotes state controls. Since OLS estimates of in the above model might be biased by the decision of some parents to accelerate or redshirt their children, we estimate a 2SLS model based on the following …rst stage equation:
The binary instrument Z i equals one if the individual was required by state law to delay kindergarten entry. In other words if the child's month of birth is later than the state kindergarten entry age cuto¤ date, Z i equals one and equals zero otherwise. In this setting, LATE implies that we identify the policy relevant parameter i.e. the e¤ect on those individuals who delay enrollment only because they are constrained by the law.
In contrast, it is unclear what the policy relevance of other LATE estimates would be even if they were consistent. For example, suppose that we use legal entry age as an instrument in a country in which everyone enters exactly at the legally permitted. In this case monotonicity is satis…ed. Moreover OLS and IV are identical, which simpli…es the analysis. The LATE estimator is therefore a least squares approximation of the e¤ect of entering school when one day older. This is a reasonable measure of the e¤ect of making everyone one day older when she enters school. It is therefore a measure of the e¤ect of moving the …rst day of school one day later if nothing else changed. However, for the most part, moving the …rst day of school from early September to early October in order to raise the school entry age is not part of the policy discussion. What is under discussion is whether to change the minimum entry age. The LATE estimate using legal entry age may be a very poor estimate of the e¤ect of moving the entry age for a group of students from just under …ve years old to just under six years old.
To our knowledge, there is no large nationally representative data set with information on school entry age, educational attainment and quarter of birth. To circumvent the lack of data, we use the Two Sample Instrumental Variable (TSIV) procedure developed by Angrist and Krueger (1992, 1995) . TSIV requires that we have data on the endogenous variable (D i ) and the instrument, Z i , for a cohort in one data set and the outcome of interest (A i ) and Z i of the same cohort in another data set. We combine data from the 1960 and 1980 US Census for individuals born in the US between 1949 and 1953. We obtain …rst stage coe¢ cients from the 1960 Census and use them to predict entry age of the contemporaneous 1980 Census respondents. TSIV estimates are generated by regressing 1980 educational outcomes on the cross-sample …tted value of their entry age. Using the bootstrap method, we correct the standard errors to account for the use of a predicted value in the second stage.
Since we control for quarter of birth (and state), the instrument has a monotonic e¤ect on school entry age. The monotonicity assumption would be violated if there were "de…ers" (Angrist and Imbens, 1994; Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996) , in other words, if some children born in the fourth quarter enter school early only when they are prohibited from doing so. Although we cannot directly test for such violations, we …nd them implausible.
Our identi…cation strategy requires that the school entry cuto¤ date has no e¤ect on the educational outcomes of children who are not constrained by the law. This assumption would be violated if parents do not want their child to be the youngest in class. In this case, they might not redshirt a child born in September in a state with a late cuto¤ (e.g. January 1), but decide to redshirt in a state with an early cuto¤ (e.g., October 1). Moreover, in the 1960s there is signi…cant noncompliance, especially among fourth quarter children, in both types of states. In states with a 10/1 or 9/30 cuto¤, almost 45% of fourth quarter individuals enter school even before they are allowed to enter. On the other hand, in states which allow fourth quarter children to enter early, about 25% redshirt. 
Data
We use the 1960 US Census Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) one percent sample for school entry age data and the 1980 U.S. PUMS …ve percent sample to measure educational attainment. Both samples have information on quarter of birth.
The main endogenous variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual delayed school enrollment from the year he turned 5 to the year he turned 6 or later. Age in quarters was computed as of Census day (April 1, 1960) using information on quarter of birth. The census, however, does not collect school entry age information. School entry age can still be computed using highest grade completed if we assume that no one repeats or skips a grade. We do not know whether children attended kindergarten or entered …rst grade directly as was common during this period. We treat all individuals as having spent a year in kindergarten. Thus someone who …rst enrolled in school as a …rst-grader at exactly the age of 6 would be counted as having entered school at exactly age 5. Based on this assumption, we computed the school starting date for individuals born in the US between 1949 and 1953.
Our identi…cation strategy requires knowledge of exact kindergarten entry cuto¤ dates for 1954 to 1958, the years in which the individuals in our sample were eligible to enroll in kindergarten. We collected data on state laws regarding kindergarten entry ages. We veri…ed these laws by looking at the US historical state statutes. If the history of the statute indicated a change in the state law in any given year, we examined the state session law to determine the exact form of the change. Children who entered school in states that gave Local Education Authorities the power to set the entry age were deleted from the sample. Table 3 lists the kindergarten entry age cuto¤ dates for 1958 for the states used in our analysis.
For both samples, we use information on quarter of birth, age, state and cuto¤ date to determine whether each sample member was born before or after the state cuto¤. We delete observations for whom we cannot determine whether the individual was born before or after the cuto¤. For example, we drop individuals born in the third quarter in states with a September 1 cuto¤. In both data sets, we restrict the sample to individuals whose state of birth and current residence were identical. The sample is restricted to blacks and whites including those of Hispanic origin. For the 1980 sample, we only include individuals who had completed at least one year of schooling. Our …nal sample includes 96676 observations in the 1960 Census and 373845 observations in the 1980 Census. All regressions include dummies for quarter of birth, sex, race and state and age in quarters and age squared. (1) reports results from the regression of entry age (in years) on one quarter of birth dummy (QOB 1 versus all others). Column (2) uses three quarter of birth dummies (QOB 4 is the omitted quarter). Column (3) shows …rst stage results using legal entry age as the instrument without quarter of birth controls and …nally, column (4) reports estimates from our basic model, controlling for three birth quarters and a binary instrument (delayed by law). 10 Controlling for legally mandated delayed enrollment in column (4), the school entry age monotonically decreases with quarter of birth. Column (4) reveals that individuals born in the …rst quarter begin school when they are about one-half year older than are those born in the fourth quarter and who are not constrained by state laws. On the other hand, in column (2) the quarter of birth instrument shows a much smaller di¤erence in entry age between the …rst and the fourth quarter since it fails to control for the more restrictive laws in some states. Note also that the e¤ect of "delayed" is only .37. While some children born in the fourth quarter begin school when they are …rst allowed to enroll, others are held back an additional year until they are almost 6 years old, and some who are not legally entitled to enroll before age …ve are nevertheless able to do so.
1 0 Note that this speci…cation is isomorphic to one in which legal age is used as the instrument and quarter of birth is included in the structural equation. This speci…cation can be found in the literature as a robustness check (Elder and Lubotsky, 2006). One concern with the entry age variable is that since we assume there is no grade retention, we are overestimating the entry age. This is especially problematic since past research has
shown that the probability of repeating a grade is related to school entry age. Although we do not have information on grade retention in the Census, we can minimize the error in measuring the entry age variable by restricting the sample to the youngest cohort. Table 5 shows di¤erent speci…cations of the …rst stage. In column (2) we restrict the sample to boys while in column (3) the sample is restricted to those born in 1953. The table shows that our estimates are robust to these di¤erent speci…cations. In fact, the …rst stage coe¢ cients are large and very highly statistically signi…cant for each of the three speci…cations. If one assumes that entry patterns were constant from 1949 to 1953, then the di¤erence between the baseline estimates and those obtained using only the 1953 data re ‡ect the e¤ect of grade retention. In this case, estimates based on 1953 data would be preferred. Estimates using the 1953 only …rst-stage can be obtained by multiplying coe¢ cient on "delayed" in the baseline model by :3664=:4273 or :8575. It is also worth noting that, using the 1953 data, the di¤erence in entry age between those born in the second and third quarter is almost exactly .25, suggesting that monotonicity would apply to a sample of individuals born in these quarters. This, in turn, would mean that it is possible to compute a LATE based on these samples. However, it is not clear that this LATE would be of any policy interest. Table 6 reports reduced-form estimates from the 1980 Census. In column (1), which gives the reduced form when the instrument is "born in …rst quarter," the instrument is associated with a large negative e¤ect on educational attainment. In column (2), legal entry age instrument shows a somewhat smaller and statistically insigni…cant adverse e¤ect. Finally, the last column indicates that controlling for quarter of birth, there is almost no e¤ect of delayed school entry on educational attainment. Table 4 , we predict entry age for the 1980 Census respondents. TSIV estimates are generated by a regression of 1980 educational outcomes on the predicted entry age. To calculate the asymptotic variances of our estimators, we use the bootstrap method.
Reduced-Form and TSIV Estimates
We correct the standard errors to account for the fact that the predicted value of school entry age is used in the second stage. When we use "born in the …rst quarter"as our instrument, consistent with Angrist and Krueger, we …nd a large negative e¤ect of school entry age on educational attainment. When we use legal entry age (not controlling for quarter of birth), we …nd a smaller but still substantial adverse e¤ect that falls short of statistical signi…cance at conventional levels and is therefore consistent with the zero e¤ect in Bedard and Dhuey. Finally, when we use the consistent estimator that meets the monotonicity requirement, our estimate is very close to zero. 
Optimal School Entry Age
The three estimates in Table 7 may di¤er for one or both of two reasons. First, if the failure of the monotonicity assumption is important, quarter of birth and legal entry age instruments do not provide a consistent estimate of a local average treatment e¤ect. Second, the local average treatment e¤ects captured by the instruments may di¤er. To determine the important of these two sources of divergence, we propose and estimate a model of optimal school entry age. We then use the model to examine the relations between the two standard IV estimators and the e¤ects they are intended to measure.
Model
Every child has an optimal school entry age, E i , where
We assume that the random component, e E i is distributed Beta( ; ) with the two shape parameters and . The parameters a 0 and a 1 determine the bounds of the optimal entry age distribution, a 0 gives the lower bound while a 0 + a 1 sets the upper bound. We allow a 0 to depend on the state entry age law. However, because we have data on quarter of birth (as opposed to month of birth), we restrict the analysis to two types of states. The unconstrained states (u) refers to states with a either a 1/1 cuto¤ or a 12/31 cuto¤. The second type of state, the fourth quarter constrained state (c); is restricted to states with 9/30 or 10/1 cuto¤.
We introduce a shift parameter for being in a constrained state:
This implies that raising the minimum entry age for fourth quarter children may a¤ect the optimal entry age for everyone else. By allowing the optimal entry age to be a¤ected by school entry age laws, we are allowing for spillover e¤ect of laws. Existence of such externalities would be a violation of the exclusion restriction required for identi…cation using instrumental variables, including our own, based on legal entry age.
Let E i be the actual age at which a child begins school. E i would di¤er across children because of di¤erences in quarter of birth and school cuto¤. We assume that students su¤er an education penalty if they enter at an age other than their optimal entry age E i . For example, a student who is born on March 1 and whose optimal entry age would be age 5
(if school started on March 1), is now forced to enter at age 5.5 because school begins on September 1. She su¤ers a loss associated with being six months away from her optimal entry age. We assume that the education loss is quadratic in the absolute departure from optimal entry age. Thus, ultimate educational attainment is given by:
S i , which is unobserved, is the educational attainment the individual would have attained if she had entered at exactly her optimal entry age. We assume that S i is independent of quarter of birth and state cuto¤ date. This assumption rules out season of birth e¤ects Jaeger, 1995, 2000) and also allows us to focus attention on the quadratic cost term.
Our choice of this particular form is driven by the paucity of data. As discussed below, we use the data to identify six parameters. We impose that a u o + a 1 equals 7: In other words the highest optimal school entry age in an unconstrained state is seven years old.
We choose this restriction because all states require children to enter school by the time they are eight years old. Since in most states, kindergarten is not required, eight year olds starting school would typically enter …rst grade. This is equivalent to requiring children to begin kindergarten at age seven in our model.
Indirect Inference
We use indirect inference to estimate the six parameters of the model (a 0 ; ; ; ; and 1 and 2 ), with a 1 = 7 a 0 ; so that the moments from the simulation match the moments from the data. We generate 10,000 draws from the beta distribution.
For simplicity, we assume that children born in quarter 1 are born on 2/15, quarter 2 on 5/15, quarter 3 on 8/15, and quarter 4 on 11/15. Further we assume that the …rst day of school each year is August 15th in every state. This implies that Quarter 1 students can enter school at age 4.5, 5.5, or 6.5. Similarly, those born in quarter 2 can enter at 4.25, 5.25 or 6.25 and so on for the third and the fourth quarter.
We do not impose that individuals enter school at the date that is closest to their optimal entry age. Instead we assume that individuals with the lowest optimal starting age are the ones among those born in a given quarter who enter when youngest. In other words, if we observe in the data that 10% of …rst quarter children enter at age 4.5, we assume that these are the 10% of the …rst quarter children with the lowest optimal entry age.
Based on these assumptions, we use the distribution of entry age (1949-1953 cohorts) from the 1960 Census to generate simulated data. Thus, we allocate individuals to their entry age in the simulated data consistent with their quarter of birth and whether they live in a 4th quarter constrained state or not. Table 3 shows that there are 15 states in the sample with cuto¤ dates corresponding to the c and u states. The Census distribution of entry age that we use to generate the simulated data has been shown earlier in Table 2 . As previously noted, Table 2 does not suggest a spillover e¤ect of increasing entry age for those born in the fourth quarter on those born in the …rst three quarters. We have also noted that in the 1950s the laws were not strictly enforced as there is a lot of noncompliance in this sample.
Next, we regress educational attainment from the 1980 census on three quarter of birth dummies, age in quarters and its square and state dummies, separately for the two types of states to get the vector of coe¢ cients b data (i.e. a total of six moments, coe¢ cients on three quarter of birth dummies in each type of state). These coe¢ cients are the di¤erence in average education between those born in each of the …rst three quarters and those born in the fourth quarter in each type of state. Identi…cation in this model depends only on within state-type education di¤erences since we are not using the di¤erence in average educational attainment between the two types of states.
Finally, we characterize the loss function as the sum of the squared deviations between the regression coe¢ cients from the simulated data and the actual regression coe¢ cients weighted by the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the estimates, b .
More formally, the objective of our indirect inference simulations is to choose parameters of optimal entry age distribution ( ; ; a 0 ; plus the shift parameter for constrained states, ) and of the education loss function ( 1 and 2 ) to minimize the following loss function: Table 8 shows results from regressions of educational attainment on three quarter of birth dummies using the actual and simulated data. It shows the average di¤erence in educational attainment between the fourth quarter and the three other quarters. Consistent with Angrist and Krueger (1991) , in both types of states individuals born in the …rst quarter get less education than do those born in the other quarters. Table 8 also shows the estimates based on simulated data from three variants of the model described in the previous section. Model I is the unconstrained model previously described. It …ts the actual data almost exactly. 11 Model II constrains the quadratic term 2 to be zero, while model III constrains both 2 and , the shift parameter between constrained and unconstrained states both to be zero. It is evident that neither of these restrictions prevents the model from …tting the empirical parameters quite precisely. We 1 1 Although the literature on indirect inference assumes that if the number of model parameters equals the number of empirical parameters, the …t must be perfect, it is easy to show that this need not be the case even when the underlying model is correctly speci…ed. The top panel of table 9 shows the …tted parameters. The …rst column gives the parameters for the base model. For the most part, the estimated parameters are plausible.
Simulation Results
The lowest optimal entry age is just under four years old; the mean is about 5.3, and the distribution is somewhat skewed so that the median is lower. There is little evidence of an external e¤ect from raising the minimum school entry age. The distribution of optimal entry ages is less than .01 higher in states with an October 1 cuto¤ than in states with a cuto¤ at the end of the year. The main problem with the model in the …rst column is that the cost parameters are implausible. The estimates imply that individuals bene…t from deviating from their optimal entry age until the deviation exceeds six months and that those who deviate by a year do almost as well as those who enter at exactly their optimal age.
We therefore restrict the quadratic term to be zero. The results are shown in the second column. We note …rst that the restriction cannot be rejected. The loss function only increases to .78, well below the critical value for a chi-squared with one degree of freedom. 12 The lowest optimal entry age is now estimated to be four and a half, suggesting that some children born in the …rst quarter should enter in the year they turn four, something that was relatively unusual even in the 1950s. The parameters of the beta-distribution imply that optimal entry age is very skewed. The mean is 6:3 but the median is only 5:0. Most children would bene…t from entering when relatively young, but some would be better o¤ being signi…cantly older than the norm.
We continue to …nd no evidence that constraining the age at which children born in the fourth quarter can enter school has any e¤ect on the optimal age for other children. The estimated value of is less than .01. Therefore in the third column of Table 9 , we restrict the value of to be zero.
Given the very low value of ; it is not surprising that this restriction cannot be rejected.
The loss function increases by only .03, and the remaining results do not change noticeably.
If we accept the two parameters restrictions imposed in the third column, then, in principle, it is possible to unconstrain a 1 which determines the oldest age at which it is optimal for any child to entry school. It will be apparent that since the loss function is only .81, we will not be able to reject that the a 0 + a 1 equals 7. In practice, a 1 is very imprecisely estimated, and we have been unable to converge the model without this restriction.
Both the second and third columns of Table 9 imply that the cost of entering at the wrong age is large. A child who enters at exactly age 5 and who should have entered at exactly age 6 or vice versa loses, on average, about two-thirds of a year of education. Of course, almost everyone can choose to enter within six months of her optimal entry age.
The major exceptions are individuals with very young optimal entry ages who are born in the …rst quarter or who are born in the fourth quarter in states requiring them to wait until the year in which they turn six to enter school.
Reconsidering the Instruments
As discussed earlier, there are at least two reasons that the IV estimates using (…rst) quarter of birth, legal age, and delayed by law may diverge. The …rst is that the failure of the monotonicity assumption makes either one or both of the …rst two estimators inconsistent.
The second is that they measure di¤erent local average treatment e¤ects. Table 10 shows the results of applying each of the IV estimators to the data generated by our model. We calculated the estimates for the models in columns 2 and 3 of Table 9 .
Since they gave identical results to two decimal places, we do not distinguish between them
here.
The …rst column of Table 10 repeats the results from Table 7 . The corresponding rows in the second column show the estimates applied to our data. Although our parameters
were not chosen to match the three IV estimates, the model …ts the broad pattern found in the data. The "born in …rst quarter" instrument shows the most adverse e¤ect of delaying entry while the "delayed by law" instrument …nds the least adverse and possibly positive e¤ect. In each case, the estimate derived from the model lies within the con…dence interval of the actual estimate.
Next we ask how well each IV estimator would capture its intended LATE if the true world were generated by our model. What LATE should each estimator capture? In the absence of monotonicity the concept is not well-de…ned. For the quarter-of-birth instrument, our solution is to treat all induced entry age changes as positive. To do this, we rank every observation in increasing order of the optimal entry age in each of the four quarters. We match the corresponding lowest optimal entry age in the …rst quarter with the lowest in the second, third and fourth quarters. Similarly, the second lowest in the …rst quarter is matched with second lowest in each of the other quarters and so on. Thus, we match up individuals in the …rst quarter with individuals with the same ranking in the optimal entry age distribution in the other three quarters. Next, we calculate the di¤erence in entry age and the di¤erence in education for each of the observations to get a total of three di¤erences for each observation in each type of state and six di¤erences overall. Since we want to satisfy monotonicity, if the di¤erence in entry age is negative, we ‡ip the sign of the entry age and education attainment di¤erences. Using these numbers, we calculate the true LATE as the total loss in education divided by the di¤erence in average entry age. In e¤ect this de…nes LATE as the local average treatment e¤ect of taking someone born in the …rst quarter and having him be born in each of the other three quarters in each of the two types of states but accounting for the sign of the e¤ect on entry age.
The true LATE de…ned in this way is given in the second row of the last column of Table 10 . At least in the world represented by our model, the IV estimator is somewhat biased but not badly so. It is o¤ by about .03.
Although the legal entry LATE relies on variation in both birth date and state laws, it seems to us that the goal is to estimate the e¤ect of a small increase in entry age (from being born on, for example, February 1 rather than February 2) rather than some strange combination of small increases due to birth dates and large increases due to state law. We therefore calculate the (numeric) derivative of educational attainment with respect to an increase in entry age for all individuals in our sample and take the average. The result of this exercise is shown in the fourth line of the last column in Table 10 . It is evident that if this is the LATE that "legal age" is intended to capture, then it badly fails to do so. The estimated LATE is quite far from the true LATE. By construction, using our approach we get a consistent LATE estimate of the e¤ect of the policy change prohibiting children born in the fourth quarter from entering school in the year they turn …ve on the educational attainment of those born in the fourth quarter whose behavior is a¤ected by the law. However, it is important to recognize that our estimates assume that there are no externalities from this change. We …nd no evidence of the existence of such externalities, but this is quite di¤erent from …nding strong evidence of their absence. Conditional on this caveat, those children whose entry is delayed, on average, are not harmed and may bene…t slightly from the delay.
Policy Experiments
An important policy question that arises from our analysis is whether our results would hold in the current school system where school entry laws are relatively strictly enforced. The weakly enforced cuto¤ dates in the 1950's may not be applicable to the debates involving school entry age today. To study the e¤ect of delaying school entry on attainment in recent years, we use the simulated data to perform some policy experiments.
First, we look at the e¤ect of moving from a January 1 cuto¤ to an October 1 cuto¤ around the 1950's, a period when such cuto¤s were very loosely enforced. Second, we consider what would have happened had their been a strict October 1 cuto¤. Table 11 reports the results from these two experiments. In the …rst column, we explore the e¤ect of the policy in a model that permits the policy to a¤ect the optimal entry age.
In this experiment we assume that the small di¤erences we observe between the entry age decisions of parents of children born in the …rst three quarters and living in constrained states and those of their counterparts in unconstrained states re ‡ect responses to the change in optimal entry age. When we use the model that assumes no externalities, we assume such entry age changes are random and ignore them.
The top panel shows the e¤ect of weak enforcement. In both models there is a slight increase in average education, with the bene…ts accruing primarily among children born in the fourth quarter. Strikingly, even though the average child born in the fourth quarter bene…ts, in each model roughly half of those whom the law causes to delay entry bene…t and half do not. When we allow the policy to increase the optimal entry age for everyone, most children born in the other quarters bene…t, but the average gains are very small. The lower panel shows the results from the policy experiment with strict enforcement.
In the …rst column, we assume that the increase in optimal entry age is proportional to the increase in average entry age, so there is a bigger externality when enforcement is strict.
Both with and without an e¤ect on optimal entry age, we …nd that moving from a January 1 cuto¤ lowers average educational attainment by about .06 years, with a large adverse e¤ect on those born in the fourth quarter and positive e¤ects on those born in the …rst two quarters in the scenario allowing for externalities.
When laws were weakly enforced, the constrained children (those born in the fourth quarter) had the option to enter school earlier than o¢ cially permissible. We see ample evidence of this happening in our data. In this environment, overall, children bene…ted, in terms of higher educational attainment, by moving to an October 1st cuto¤. However, the policy experiment suggests that, in an environment where laws are strictly enforced, constraining fourth quarter children to enter late hurts these children and reduces average educational attainment.
Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that previous studies that have used IV to deal with the endogeneity of school entry age have focused on a LATE of no real policy or practical interest. Moreover, they have failed to provide consistent estimates of the LATE because of the failure of the monotonicity assumption. As a practical matter, this turns out to be a bigger problem for the "legal age" instrument than for the "…rst-quarter birth" instrument.
Our Two Sample Instrumental Variable (TSIV) results suggest that the quarter of birth instrument yields severely biased estimates of the policy-relevant LATE. The born in …rst quarter instrument, consistent with Angrist and Krueger, gives a large negative e¤ect of school entry age on educational attainment. When we use legal entry age (not controlling for quarter of birth), we …nd a smaller adverse e¤ect but one that falls short of statistical signi…cance at conventional levels (consistent with the zero e¤ect in Bedard and Dhuey).
We propose an instrument that satis…es the monotonicity assumption and gives a consistent estimates of the policy-relevant LATE: the e¤ect of requiring a child to enter school in the year she turns six when she would otherwise have entered a year earlier. The results are consistent with no important policy e¤ect as the policy was practiced in the 1950s.
However, over the last …fty years, school entry age laws have become noticeably stricter both in requiring children to be older before entering school and through stricter enforcement of the laws limiting entry although they generally continue to permit redshirting. We …nd that stricter enforcement of the laws in the 1950s would have had adverse e¤ects on educational attainment. While we do not know whether the results continue to apply today, they do provide evidence of considerable variation in optimal entry age and therefore suggest that having a waiver policy that gives constrained children the choice to enter earlier than the legally established age could increase educational attainment, particularly among groups that have high dropout rates.
